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RONALD L. NELSON*
This article rebuts recent criticism of efforts by state supreme
courts to interpret state constitutional provisions differently than
the United States Supreme Court interprets analogous provisions
in the United States Constitution. This area of law, sometimes
called New Judicial Federalism, has been the subject of consider-
able comment over the last twenty years. By focusing on equal
protection, privacy, religious freedom and access to natural
resources, the article examines Alaska's unique constitutional
background and independent interpretation. This analysis of
Alaskan constitutional rights reveals a viable and active brand of
New Judicial Federalism. The article concludes that Alaska's
independent approach to state constitutional law is an example of
a constitutional discourse that is both uniquely local and national-
ly valuable.
I. INTRODUCTION
There where the mighty mountains bare their
fangs unto the moon,
There where the sullen sun-dogs glare in the
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snow-bright, bitter noon,
And the glacier-gutted streams sweep down at
the clarion call of June.
There where the livid tundras keep their tryst
with the tranquil snows;
There where the silences are spawned, and the
light of hell-fire flows
Into the bowl of the midnight sky, violet, amber
and rose.
There where the rapids churn and roar, and the
ice-flows bellowing run;
Where the tortured, twisted rivers of blood
rush to the setting sun -
I've packed my kit and I'm going, boys, ere
another day is done....
-Robert W. Service1
Regardless of what they may once have been, Americans are
now a people who are so alike from state to state, and whose
identity is so much associated with national values and institu-
tions, that the notion of significant local variations in character
and identity is just too implausible to take seriously as the basis
for a distinct constitutional discourse.
-Professor James A. Gardner2
The term "New Judicial Federalism" ("NJF")-also known as
the "state law revolution," the "state bill of rights movement" or,
more commonly, "state constitutionalism"-describes a trend in
state courts to rely on state rather than federal constitutional law
to decide cases, particularly cases involving individual rights This
trend has reawakened many state courts to their inherent authority
to construe state constitutional rights independently from the
United States Constitution.4 In recent years, a mass of commentary
1. ROBERT W. SERVICE, The Heart of the Sourdough, in THE COMPLETE
PoEMs OF ROBERT SERVICE 19, 19-20 (1941).
2. James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90
MIcH. L. REv. 761, 818 (1992).
3. A state court exercising an independent NJF interpretation of a state
constitutional provision is free to reach a conclusion different from the one the
United States Supreme Court might reach when interpreting an analogous
provision in the United States Constitution. There is no conflict if the federal
minimum is enforced. See, e.g., Peter J. Galie, Other Supreme Court Judicial
Activism Among State Supreme Courts, 33 SYRACUSE L. REv. 731, 732 (1982).
This system of law results from the dual sovereignty and national supremacy
concepts of American federalism established by the Constitution. See generally
THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J. Madison).
4. Galie, supra note 3, at 732. Various reasons for this state law revolution
have been suggested. Perhaps the most commonly cited "cause" is the conserva-
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has accumulated with respect to this area of the law.' While not
the focus of any in-depth NJF analysis, the Alaska Supreme Court
has been recognized for its activist approach to independent
application of its state constitution.'
In a 1992 Michigan Law Review article, James A. Gardner, a
professor at Western New England College School of Law, argued
that NJF is a failed enterprise that has resulted in "a vast wasteland
of confusing, conflicting, and essentially unintelligible pronounce-
ments."7 Professor Gardner reached this conclusion after conduct-
tism of the Burger-Rehnquist Supreme Court. See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 2, at
762. As the Court stopped and even retreated in the area of individual rights,
litigants and judges began to examine state constitutions as sources of protection.
This is particularly true in the area of positive individual rights. Such rights are
more like grants or entitlements than the traditional negative or limiting protection
of the Constitution. United States Supreme Court Justice William Brennan
encouraged the movement with a 1977 law review article that urged state courts
to forge ahead in the protection of individual rights through the use of state
constitutional provisions. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the
Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489 (1977); see also Gardner,
supra note 2, at 771.
5. See generally Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604 (Wyoming 1993) (presenting
arguments for and against NJF); Shirley S. Abrahamson & Diane S. Gutmann, The
New Federalism: State Constitutions, 71 JUDICATURE 88 (1987); Brennan, supra
note 4; Ronald K.L. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-Away From a
Reactionary Approach, 9 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 1 (1981); Charles E. Douglas, n-I,
State Judicial Activism-The New Role for State Bills of Rights, 12 SUFFOLK U. L.
REv. 1123 (1978); Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitu-
tionalism, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1147 (1993); Yvonne Kaujen, Reflections on
Federalism: Protection Afforded by State Constitutions, 27 GONZ. L. REv. 1 (1991-
92); Earl M. Maltz, Lockstep Analysis and the Concept of Federalism, 496 ANNALS
AM. AcAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 98 (1988); Burt Newborne, Foreword: State
Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 881 (1989);
Stewart G. Pollock, Adequate and Independent Grounds as a Means of Balancing
the Relation Between State and Federal Courts, 63 TEX. L. REv. 972 (1985)
(appearing in an NJF symposium issue); James G. Pope, An Approach to State
Constitutional Interpretation, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 985 (1993); Robert F. Williams,
State Constitutional Law Process, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV, 169 (1983).
6. See, e.g., Stanley H. Friedelbaum, The "New" Judicial Federalism, in THE
BOOK OF THE STATES 1992-93 247 (1991); Peter J. Galie, State Constitutional
Guarantees and the Alaska Supreme Court: Criminal Procedure Rights and the New
Federalism, 1960-1981, 18 GONZ. L. REv. 221, 223 (1982-83); John Kincaid, The
New Judicial Federalism, 61 J. ST. GOV'T 163, 165 (Sept.-Oct. 1988); Barry Latzer,
The Hidden Conservativism of the State Court "Revolution", 74 JUDICATURE 190,
192 (1991).
7. Gardner, supra note 2, at 763. For commentary on Professor Gardner's
article, see Roundtable, Responses to James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of
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ing a one-year survey of the decisions of the highest courts in seven
selected states. Based on this survey, he also concluded that the
primary shortcoming in state constitutional analysis is a general
"failure of state courts to develop a coherent discourse of state
constitution law-that is, a language in which it is possible for
participants in the legal system to make intelligible claims about the
meaning of state constitutions."8
Professor Gardner's specific criticisms of state constitutional
law included charges that state courts have "grudgingly" turned to
their own constitutions, 9 that state constitutional decisions do not
specify their constitutional bases," that state decisions often simply
follow federal decisions and fail to distinguish between state and
federal constitutional bases for decisions," and that state constitu-
tional decisions are silent with respect to state constitutional
history.2 In other words, the states simply do not have an
independent constitutional discourse. Professor Gardner concluded
that "[t]he overwhelming impression left by an examination of state
constitutional decisions is that state courts by and large have little
interest in creating the kind of state constitutional discourse
necessary to build an independent body of state constitutional
law.""3  In contrast to the "impoverished" condition of state
constitutional law, Professor Gardner declares that the "federal
constitutional discourse is extraordinarily rich." 4
This article is intended as an Alaskan rebuttal of Professor
Gardner's thesis. As an initial matter, his arguments suffer from an
inherently flawed methodology. The proposition that a one-year,
seven-state survey can render conclusive evidence about a twenty-
five year NJF trend in fifty separate jurisdictions strains credulity.
Not only does this methodology raise questions of statistical
significance, it also reveals a latent assumption that states are
basically fungible.
State Constitutionalism, 24 RtrGERs L.J. 927 (1993); David Schuman, A Failed
Critique of State Constitutionalism, 91 MICH. L. REv. 274 (1992); Robert F. Utter,
The Practice of Principled Decision-Making in State Constitutionalism: Washing-
ton's Experience, 65 TEMPLE L. REv. 1153 (1992).
8. Gardner, supra note 2, at 763-64.
9. Id. at 781.
10. Id. at 785.
11. Id. at 789.
12. Id. at 793.
13. Id. at 804.
14. Id. at 770.
[Vol. 12:1
1995] STATE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 5
This methodological flaw is evident in Professor Gardner's
choice of seven states to represent the diversity of all fifty states.
His conclusion that New York, Massachusetts, Virginia, Louisiana,
California, Kansas and New Hampshire can effectively represent all
states is surpassed in reductionism only by his assumption that five
selected factors can account for all variations among the states.'5
Additionally, it is somewhat incongruous that Professor Gardner
specifically rejects analysis of Alaska's constitutional discourse
because the state has had insufficient "time necessary to develop a
substantial body of constitutional law"'6 while he, at the same
time, limits his study to a single year. As Professor Gardner
recognizes in his exclusion of Alaska, discourse is, by its very
nature, something that occurs over time; it is not something
rationally limited to one year. This article will attempt to address
this weakness in Gardner's analysis by surveying a single state, in
detail, in order to demonstrate at least one clear exception to
Professor Gardner's ultimate conclusion that "state constittutional
law is... marginal to legal life."'
17
By examining Alaska's state constitutional jurisprudence, this
article will demonstrate that at least one jurisdiction is distinctive
in its community and enjoys a rich constitutional discourse of its
own. This analysis will illustrate that NJF is a positive development
that is engaged in a reasoned discourse about individual rights in
the American system. This article will accomplish this objective by
examining four areas of Alaskan constitutional rights law: equal
protection, privacy, freedom of religion and natural resource rights.
Perhaps after a review of state constitutional interpretation in
Alaska, critics of NFJ will reconsider their call for what essentially
amounts to the abandonment of federalism as a viable principle of
our system of constitutional government.
II. BACKGROUND TO ALASKA AND ITS CONSTITUTION
Alaska is very different from the other forty-nine states. It is
a land of vast proportions and contrasts. If superimposed on the
continental United States, Alaska would stretch westward from
15. For Professor Gardner's explanation of his sampling, see Gardner, supra
note 2, at 779 n.64. His five relevant factors are state size, state age, founding
history, constitutional continuity and constitutional text.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 837. For similar approaches relating to the states of Oregon and
Washington, see Schuman, supra note 7, and Utter, supra note 7, respectively.
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Georgia to California and northward from Texas to Minnesota."s
The temperatures in interior Alaska can range from 100 degrees
fahrenheit during the 24-hour days of summer to -80 degrees
fahrenheit during the 24-hour nights of winter. 9 The elevation
ranges from sea-level to over 20,000 feet on Denali (Mount
McKinley).'O Alaska is not bounded by the continental United
States, but rather by Canada to the east, and to the south, west and
north by the North Pacific Ocean, the Bering and Chukchi Seas,
and the Arctic Ocean, respectively.2 Approximately one-half
million people live on approximately one-half million square miles.
The people speak English, Haida, Tlingit, Tsimshian, Aleut and
several dialects of Eskimo and Athabascan.' Alaskans live
primarily either in very small towns or villages-often accessible
only by air or water travel-or in one of the two largest cities in
the state, Anchorage and Fairbanks. Juneau, a rather remote
smaller city in southeast Alaska, is the capital.'
Alaska's physical and demographic differences are part of a
background that distinguishes it from the other forty-nine states.
These differences are of such magnitude as to render suspect
Professor Gardner's claim that significant local variation in
America is implausible. Alaska's uniqueness, which begins with its
physical features and its people, is so pervasive that it permeates its
state constitution.
Alaska was purchased from Russia in 1867 for 7.2 million
dollars.24 It was governed as a federal territory until it achieved
statehood in 1959.' The Constitution of the State of Alaska was
drafted in the winter of 1955-56 at a state constitutional convention
held at the University of Alaska-Fairbanks campus.26 The resulting
18. See GERALD A. MCBEATH & THOMAS A. MOREHOUSE, ALASKA
PoLmcs AND GOvERNMENT 7 (1994); CLAUS-M. NASKE & HERMAN E.
SLOTNICK, ALASKA: A HISTORY OF THE 49TH STATE 5 (2d ed. 1987).
19. MCBEATH & MOREHOUSE, supra note 18, at 11.
20. Id. at 10.
21. Id. at 8-9.
22. THE ALASKA ALMANAC, FACTS ABOUT ALASKA 100 (1986).
23. Id. at 72.
24. NASKE & SLOTNICK, supra note 18, at 60-61.
25. McBEATH & MOREHOUSE, supra note 18, at 29-50.
26. Id. at 48. For an analysis and history of the Alaska Constitutional
Convention and the resultant Alaska Constitution, see VICTOR FISCHER,
ALASKA'S CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (1975); GORDON S. HARRISON,
ALASKA'S CoNSTrruTION: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE (3d ed. 1992).
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document was ratified by the Alaskan electorate in 1956.27 This
constitution reflects the unique Alaskan viewpoint of the territorial
drafters, as well as the advice of national experts and the example
of the Model State Constitution.' The general orientation of the
Alaska constitution is toward the future.29 It envisions a positive
governmental role in the development of the vast resources of the
state.30  This orientation stems, in part, from the pre-statehood
status of the constitution; it was drafted in hopes of Alaska being
admitted as a state. One of the main purposes of the convention
was to produce a document that would demonstrate to Congress
and the forty-eight states that Alaska was politically mature and
able to govern itself 31  Resulting from this desire to create a
modern, workable constitution, the drafters followed the lessons of
the constitutional reform movement of the 1930's and opted for a
relatively short and simple document which granted positive
authority to the legislature and the governor.32
The provisions for personal rights protection in the Alaska
constitution are primarily contained in article I, entitled Declaration
of Rights.33 While the federal Bill of Rights obviously served as
a model for the Declaration of Rights, the drafters consulted both
the Model State Constitution and the constitutions of other states.
As a result, the Declaration of Rights is not a carbon copy of the
federal Bill of Rights. It is also noteworthy that, because of
Alaska's status as a federal territory prior to statehood, the federal
Bill of Rights was the only constitutional declaration of rights
applicable to Alaska before its own constitution.'
27. MCBEATH & MOREHOUSE, supra note 18, at 48.
28. HARRIsON, supra note 26, at 3-7.
29. The delegates came to the convention on a non-partisan basis and
generally embraced the goal of writing the best long-term, forward-looking
constitution possible. Interview with Judge Seaborn J. Buckalew, Jr., retired
Alaska Superior Court Judge, former territorial legislator, former territorial U.S.





33. Article I of the Alaska constitution is set out in full in the Appendix.
34. See Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905) (stating that under
the treaty with Russia and subsequent congressional legislation, Alaska was
incorporated into the United States and the United States Constitution became
applicable to the territory of Alaska).
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In 1958, shortly after ratification, Professor P. Allan Di-
onisopoulos of Indiana University surveyed the "new" Alaska
constitution." He compared it to the Indiana constitution enacted
in 1851 by considering civil rights and social welfare, executive-
-legislative relations, executive-administrative relations, the
judiciary, popular participation, local governments, finance and
taxation, and the amending process.36 Professor Dionisopoulos
found that
[t]he Alaska Constitution is the product of a rugged, frontier
community; yet its content fits a modem day, complex, industrial
society. It combines the experience of other states with contem-
porary ideas on constitution-making, tradition with innovation,
and the classical with the modem. While certain of its provisions
are peculiar to the special situations in Alaska, this basic law
may well serve as a model for constitutional revision in older
states. Perhaps the Alaska Constitution has most nearly
approximated the ideal.37
Clearly, the Alaska constitution is not merely a weak copy of
the United States Constitution. The Alaska constitution was
purposefully "customized" for the Alaskan experience, and it is
within this context that the Alaska constitution has been interpret-
ed.
III. INTERPRETATION OF THE ALASKA CONSTITUTION
Early in its existence, and well before the calls for NJF, the
Alaska Supreme Court addressed the question of its independent
authority to interpret the Alaska constitution. Just ten months
after Alaska's courts became fully operational, the state's new
supreme court decided Knudsen v. City of Anchorage.38 Knudsen,
a driver who lost his license under a city reckless driving ordinance,
appealed his conviction by challenging the denial of his demand for
The Alaska constitution addresses certain rights not covered in the federal
constitution. For example, the Alaska constitution covers the right to equal
opportunities, ALASKA CONST., art. I, § 1; the right to receive fair and just
treatment in legislative hearings, id. § 7; special bail rights, id. § 11; and protection
from debtor's prisons, id. § 17. Additionally, certain other areas of personal
concern are addressed in separate articles. For instance, education is covered in
article VII and the environment is a major topic of article VIII.
35. P. Allan Dionisopoulos, Indiana, 1851, Alaska, 1956: A Century of
Difference in State Constitutions, 34 IND. L.J. 34 (1958).
36. Id. at 35.
37. Id. at 54.
38. 358 P.2d 375 (Alaska 1960).
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a jury trial. The issue on appeal was whether the state constitu-
tion's right to a jury trial in article I, section 11 followed federal
constitutional practice. The court examined the records of Alaska's
constitutional convention in addition to acts passed by Congress
and the Alaska territorial legislature relating to the right to a jury
trial.39 The court concluded that the drafters of the state constitu-
tion intended that section 11 give Alaskans the same jury trial
protection as that afforded by the federal Sixth Amendment, rather
than the broader protection available to defendants in Alaska at
the turn of the century before there was a territorial legislature.'
The question of whether Knudsen meant that state constitu-
tional provisions were necessarily to follow the United States
Supreme Court's interpretation of analogous federal provisions was
answered some nine years later in Roberts v. State.4' Roberts
involved an appeal of a forgery conviction based on handwriting
exemplars taken without the presence of previously appointed
defense counsel. The Alaska Supreme Court found a violation of
the defendant's constitutional right to counsel under article I,
section 11. Declaring federal precedent distinguishable, the court
specifically ruled that
[w]e are not bound in expounding the Alaska Constitution's
Declaration of Rights by the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, past or future, which expound identical or
closely similar provisions of the United States Constitution....
To look only to the United States Supreme Court for constitu-
tional guidance would be an abdication by this court of its
constitutional responsibilities.4"
The court expressly overruled inconsistent portions of Knudsen and
provided guidance regarding the general right to counsel at a
critical stage under the state constitution.43
39. Id. at 377-81.
40. Id. at 379.
41. 458 P.2d 340 (Alaska 1969).
42. Id. at 342.
43. Id. at 349-350. There were two strong dissenting opinions in Roberts. Id.
at 349-53 (Nesbett, C.J., dissenting); id. at 353-55 (Dimond, J., dissenting). Neither
opinion challenged the authority of the court to independently interpret the state's
constitution. Both instead agreed that the federal courts should only provide
guidance. Id. at 349 (Nesbett, C.J., dissenting); id. at 355 (Dimond, J., dissenting).
In fact, Chief Justice Nesbett, who wrote the earlier Knudsen opinion, noted that
Knudsen never stood for the proposition that federal rulings on similar issues were
binding on the state courts. Knudsen merely found that the decisions that were
of record at the time of the constitutional convention were to be given great
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
Less than one year after Roberts, the Alaska Supreme Court
again addressed independent interpretation of the right to jury trial
provision of the state constitution. In Baker v. City of Fair-
banks,' after a lengthy examination of the records of the constitu-
tional convention, federal and state court decisions, the Federalist
Papers, the Declaration of Independence and Knudsen, the court
overruled Knudsen by holding that the state constitution requires
a jury trial upon demand, except in the most minor traffic violation
cases.
45
The Baker court specifically recognized that, after Knudsen
was decided, the United States Supreme Court made the Sixth
Amendment provisions relating to jury trials applicable to the
states.4 6 However, this fact did not preclude the Alaska court from
interpreting the rights guaranteed by the Alaska constitution to
exceed the protections in the United States Constitution. The
court's conclusions provide an apt summary of Alaska's general
approach to state constitutional interpretation:
While we must enforce the minimum constitutional standards
imposed upon us by the United States Supreme Court's interpre-
tation of the Fourteenth Amendment, we are free, and we are
under a duty, to develop additional constitutional rights and
privileges under our Alaska Constitution if we find such
fundamental rights and privileges to be within the intention and
spirit of our local constitutional language and to be necessary for
the kind of civilized life and ordered liberty which is at the core
of our constitutional heritage. We need not stand by idly and
passively, waiting for constitutional direction from the highest
court of the land. Instead, we should be moving concurrently to
develop and expound the principles embedded in our constitu-
tional law.47
weight. This deference would not apply to United States Supreme Court cases
decided after the convention. Id. at 349-50 (Nesbett, C.J., dissenting).
44. 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970). It is worth noting that although Professor
Gardner asserted that NJF is rooted in a response to the mid-1970s jurisprudence
of the United States Supreme Court, Gardner, supra note 2, at 771, Roberts and
Baker were 1969 and 1970 decisions, respectively.
45. Baker, 471 P.2d at 401-02.
46. Id. at 387-89 (analyzing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)).
47. Id. at 401-02. This standard of interpretation has been praised by
commentator Mary Cornelia Porter as a model of independent state judicial
reasoning. MARY C. PORTER & G. ALAN TARR, STATE SuPREME COURTs:
POLICYMAKERS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 14-15 (1982).
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IV. ALASKA'S CONSTITUTIONAL DIscouRSE
In his article, Professor Gardner defines constitutional
discourse as "a language and set of conventions that allow a
participant in the legal system to make an intelligible claim about
the meaning of the constitution."'  This definition seems limited.
In contrast, Webster defines discourse as "the process of proceed-
ing from one judgment to another in a logical sequence ... the
expression of ideas; [especially] formal and orderly expression in
speech or writing."49  This definition emphasizes a well-stated
logical analysis which develops over time. In addition, Webster
provides that a "discourse" involves a "verbal interchange of
ideas.""0  Given the need for an exchange of ideas, Gardner's
distinction between federal and state discourse is debilitating. The
decisions of all jurisdictions of the American legal system use the
same basic language to articulate specific points of law which may
vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction or even from circuit to circuit.
The question of whether a discourse exists therefore turns on what
is said with this common language.5' Thus, Alaska's state consti-
tutional decisions-particularly in the areas of equal protection,
privacy, freedom of religion and natural resources-have something
worth saying and hearing, not just for Alaskans but also for the rest
of the nation.
A. Equal Protection
Perhaps the most important aspect of Alaska's departure from
federal constitutional analysis comes in equal protection law.
48. Gardner, supra note 2, at 767.
49. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICrIONARY 647 (1981).
50. Id.
51. Several commentators have made significant contributions to the Alaskan
discourse. For example, attorney Jeffrey Feldman and Professor Peter Galie have
written articles detailing Alaska constitutional developments in criminal procedure.
See Jeffrey M. Feldman, Criminal Procedure in Alaska, 9 UCLA-ALASKA L. REV.
109 (1980); Jeffrey M. Feldman, Search and Seizure in Alaska. A Comprehensive
Review, 7 UCLA-ALASKA L. REv. 75 (1977); Galie, supra note 6. Professors
Michael Wise and Stephen Green have written articles about Alaska equal
protection and freedom of religion, respectively. Michael B. Wise, Northern
Lights-Equal Protection Analysis in Alaska, 3 ALASKA L. RPdv. 1 (1986); Stephen
K. Green, Freedom of Religion in Alaska: Interpreting the Alaska Constitution, 5
ALASKA L. REv. 237 (1988). For a discussion of Wise's article, see infra part
IV.A. For an analysis of Green's article, see infra part IV.C.
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Professor Michael B. Wise's article, Northern Lights-Equal Protec-
tion Analysis in Alaska,52 provides a detailed picture of the
constitutional discourse concerning Alaska's "sliding-scale"
approach to equal protection under the state constitution. Wise
points out that the analysis employed by the Alaska Supreme Court
stems from dissatisfaction with the development of federal law and
follows an approach suggested by Professor Gerald Gunther and
Justice Thurgood Marshall. 3  The development of the sliding-
scale test demonstrates that the Alaskan constitutional discourse is
not static. Rather, this constitutional development in Alaska is a
process concerned with finding better ways to resolve complex legal
issues.
Historically, federal equal protection analysis languished in
disuse until the Warren Court era. 4 The Warren Court eventual-
ly consolidated various approaches into a two-tier analysis. If the
alleged denial of equal protection involved a protected classification
or right, the activity received a high level of scrutiny." If the
alleged denial did not involve a protected class or right, the level
of review was minimal, asking only if the classification could
conceivably be justified by a rational explanation. This two-tier
approach received criticism from all sides, some finding the minimal
level of review too deferential and others finding the protected
rights overly broad and subjective. 7
In his article, Wise noted that "the Burger Court muddied the
waters and obscured the rigid doctrinal lines of the Warren Court's
52. Wise, supra note 51.
53. Id. at 9, 17-21, 29.
54. The standard that developed over the years was far from precise. It varied
from the test articulated in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61
(1911), which basically sustained legislative classifications with any conceivable set
of facts that would make them reasonable, to the standard outlined in F.S. Royster
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920), which held that a classification must
be reasonable, not arbitrary, and rest on some grounds with a fair and substantial
relationship to the object of the legislation. Later, the Court developed a strict
scrutiny standard for suspect classes, such as the racial classification involved in
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), and a strict scrutiny standard for
unequal treatment with respect to a basic liberty, such as the right to procreate
involved in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
55. Under the highest level of judicial scrutiny, the Court examined whether
a given state action had a "compelling" end that was achieved through means
deemed "necessary." See Wise, supra note 51, at 9.
56. Id. at 8.
57. Id. at 16-17.
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approach.""8 Moreover, Wise argued, "the Court has determined
cases without articulating a standard of review and applied a sui
generis analysis that is neither as weak as rational basis review nor
as strong as strict scrutiny. . . . In some cases, this type of
review has been called intermediate or heightened review."0 This
approach has led to basic disarray in the pertinent discourse
surrounding federal equal protection law.6'
The United States Supreme Court has struggled with the
middle ground of the two-tier equal protection test. The cases have
taken an unpredictable path on such issues as gender, illegitimacy
and citizenship status. Wise noted that "the equal protection
doctrine of the past quarter century is laden with areas of contro-
versy. Contemporary doctrine in particular is characterized by
many starts and many stops, with all too few clear guidelines for
enduring policy."'62 Wise described many criticisms of the multi-
tier federal approach. In particular, he cited Justice Thurgood
Marshall, who was both a persistent critic of the two-tier system
and a proponent of an alternative approach, a balanced sliding
scale.63
In the early years following statehood, Alaska courts followed
federal equal protection analysis when adjudicating the state's own
constitutional guarantee of equal protection. The first case to use
the state constitution's equal protection clause to strike down a
58. Id. at 11.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
61. As evidence of this disarray, Professor Wise points to the case of City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Wise, supra note 51, at
13 n.78. In this equal protection case, involving a city's zoning ordinances that
essentially excluded retarded individuals from all residential districts in the
community, Justice White rejected the intermediate level of scrutiny applied by the
Fifth Circuit. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442. Instead, he found the zoning
improper under the rational-basis test. Id. at 447-50. The case was decided with
five justices concurring in two separate opinions, none of which approved of the
test applied by Justice White.
62. Wise, supra note 51, at 16.
63. Id. For Justice Marshall's own statement of his sliding-scale approach, see
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-30 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Justice Marshall found fault with the Dandridge majority's labeling of the
regulation as social and economic and, therefore, governed by the rational-basis
level of analysis. He urged the court to use a balancing test because this type of
case "simply def[ied] easy characterization in terms of one or the other of these
'tests."' Id. at 520.
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
statutory provision occurred in 1963.6" However, beginning in
1973, several cases included footnotes indicating "discontent" with
the two-tier test's inflexibility and pointing out, with approval,
Professor Gerald Gunther's call for a different approach. 65
In 1975, the Alaska Supreme Court was still using a single
analysis, the two-tiered federal standard. In Lynden Transport, Inc.
v. State,' the court held that an Alaska statute was invalid under
both the state and federal constitutions because it discriminated
against nonresident motor carriers. However, in a footnote, the
court expressed hope for a change at the federal level:
It has been suggested that there is mounting discontent with the
rigid two-tier formulation of the equal protection doctrine, and
that the United States Supreme Court is prepared to use the
clause more rigorously to invalidate legislation without expansion
of "fundamental rights" or "suspect" categories and the concomi-
tant resort to the "strict scrutiny" tests. We are in agreement
with the view that the Supreme Court's recent equal protection
decisions have shown a tendency toward less speculative, less
deferential, more intensified means-to-end inquiry when it is
applying the traditional rational basis test and we approve of this
development.67
The court therefore appeared prepared to wait patiently for move-
ment at the federal level of equal protection discourse.
One year later, however, the Alaska Supreme Court began to
establish its own equal protection test in Isakson v. Rickey,6 a
case involving a challenge to a limited-entry scheme for Alaska's
threatened fisheries. In invalidating the state's classification
scheme, the court used a modified rational-basis standard that
differed from the federal test by raising "the level of the lower tier
from virtual abdication to genuine inquiry."'69
64. Leege v. Martin, 379 P.2d 447 (Alaska 1963) (relying on ALAsKA CONST.
art. 1, § 1).
65. See Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494,498 (Alaska 1975); Lynden Transport, Inc.
v. State, 532 P.2d 700,706 n.10 (Alaska 1975); State v. Adams, 522 P.2d 1125,1127
n.12 (Alaska 1974); State v. Wylie, 516 P.2d 142, 145 n.4 (Alaska 1973). Each of
the opinions cited Gerald Gunther, Forewortk In Search of Evolving Doctrine on
a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1972).
66. 532 P.2d 700 (Alaska 1975).
67. Id. at 706 n.10.
68. 550 P.2d 359 (Alaska 1976).
69. Id. at 363. In reality, the "new" test was only a step away from the federal
standard, but was very similar to the old standard from F.S. Royster Guano Co.
v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920). Professor Wise notes that Isakson also shows that
[Vol. 12:1
1995] STATE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 15
True independence in equal protection analysis came to the
Alaska Supreme Court in 1978. In State v. Erickson,7 which
involved equal protection and privacy challenges to an Alaska
statute classifying cocaine as a narcotic, the court declared its own
equal protection standard. The court employed the following
sliding-scale analysis:
In cases involving federal constitutional questions, where funda-
mental rights and suspect categories are at issue, we are bound
by the "compelling state interest" standard unless the test is
altered by the United States Supreme Court. In applying the
Alaska Constitution, however, there is no reason why we cannot
use a single test. Such a test will be flexible and dependent upon
the importance of the rights involved. Based on the nature of
the right, a greater or lesser burden will be placed on the state
to show that the classification has a fair and substantial relation
to a legitimate governmental objective. Where fundamental
rights or suspect categories are involved, the results of this test
will be essentially the same as requiring a "compelling state
interest"; but, by avoiding outright categorization of fundamental
and non-fundamental rights, a more flexible, less result-oriented
analysis may be made.71
Using the new test, the court sustained the drug classification with
respect to the equal protection challenge.1 2
In Erickson, the court dealt with a number of complicated
issues. Factually, the court weighed a large amount of debated
scientific evidence about cocaine and other drugs. The equal
protection claim centered on unequal treatment due to an inappro-
priate categorization of cocaine with other, more dangerous
drugs 3 Additionally, the court finally confronted the problem of
having to apply federal equal protection analysis for federal
protection while at the same time dealing with separate state
protection.74 The fact that the court found the two-tier analysis
inadequate in cases not requiring upper-tier scrutiny led the court
to employ a separate sliding scale test for claims under the state
constitution. 75
the Alaska Supreme Court still was not ready to break with federal equal
protection analysis. Wise, supra note 51, at 28.
70. 574 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1978).
71. Id. at 11-12.
72. Id. at 17-18. The privacy challenge in Erickson is addressed infra at notes
104-08 and accompanying text.
73. Erickson, 547 P.2d at 7-10.
74. Id. at 11-12.
75. Id. at 12.
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Subsequent cases refined the equal protection test outlined in
Erickson. In State v. Ostrosky7 6 and Alaska Pacific Assurance Co.
v. Brown,77 adjustments were made to the new test.78 Moreover,
credit was given to Justices Marshall and White for making sugges-
tions that led to the development of this sliding-scale approach,79
which now has become the well-established standard for equal
protection issues in Alaska."
This summary of the development of Alaska's equal protection
standard reflects the care and thought of a state high court
seriously attempting to interpret its own constitution in light of the
76. 667 P.2d 1184 (Alaska 1983).
77. 687 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1984).
78. In Brown, Justice Rabinowitz set out the resultant test as follows:
First, it must be determined at the outset what weight should be afforded
the constitutional interest impaired by the challenged enactment. The
nature of this interest is the most important variable in fixing the
appropriate level of review. Thus, the initial inquiry under article I,
section 1 of Alaska's constitution goes to the level of scrutiny. Depending
upon the primacy of the interest involved, the state will have a greater
or lesser burden in justifying its legislation.
Second, an examination must be undertaken of the purposes served
by a challenged statute. Depending on the level of review determined,
the state may be required to show only that its objectives were legitimate,
at the low end of the continuum, or at the high end of the scale, that the
legislation was motivated by a compelling state interest.
Third, an evaluation of the state's interest in the particular means
employed to further its goals must be undertaken. Once again, the
state's burden will differ in accordance with the determination of the
level of scrutiny under the first stage of analysis. At the low end of the
sliding scale, we have held that a substantial relationship between means
and ends is constitutionally adequate. At the higher end of the scale, the
fit between the means and ends must be closer. If the purpose can be
accomplished by a less restrictive alternative, the classification will be
invalidated.
Id. at 269-70 (citation omitted).
79. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d at 1193 n.13. Recent cases have emphasized the
"sliding scale" test by name. See, e.g., State v. Anthony, 810 P.2d 155, 157 (Alaska
1991).
80. For instance, in State Dept. of Revenue v. Casio, the court declared:
Analysis under our state equal protection clause is considerably more
fluid than under its federal counterpart. Instead of using three levels of
scrutiny, we apply a sliding scale under which "[t]he applicable standard
of review for a given case is to be determined by the importance of the
individual right asserted and by the degree of suspicion with which we
view the resultant classification scheme." As the right asserted becomes
"more fundamental" or the classification scheme employed becomes
"more constitutionally suspect," the challenged law "is subjected to more
rigorous scrutiny at a more elevated position on our sliding scale."
858 P.2d 621, 629 (Alaska 1993) (citations omitted).
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Alaskan issues presented by the cases it reviews. The resultant
method of equal protection analysis is based on a reasoned
progression of state court decisions and, at least to some degree,
the lack of a coherent approach at the federal level. Moreover, the
test has an ideological foundation in Alaskan society's own
traditional concerns."' Given the shortcomings of federal equal
protection analysis and the uniquely Alaskan circumstances
informing the Alaska Supreme Court's decisions, interpretive
independence has been a natural, and welcome, result.
B. Privacy
Alaska's right to privacy, particularly in the non-criminal
context, has undergone development similar to Alaska's equal
protection doctrine.' In fact, this right to privacy may be one of
the most well-known indicators of Alaska's judicial independence.
While the right to privacy is now embodied in a specific provision
of the state constitution, it was not included in the original
Declaration of Rights. Instead, article I, section 22 was added to
the constitution in 1972. Prior to 1972, the right to privacy was
viewed by most state courts as a matter of federal protection and
not routinely addressed at the state level. In the federal courts,
however, the concept was not well-defined and was found primarily
in the right "to be let alone," the right of marital privacy, the
privacy of the home, or some other penumbral definition.'
In 1972, the Alaska Supreme Court addressed the privacy issue
when it decided a pre-amendment case, Breese v. Smith.84 Breese
involved a challenge by a student to school hair length regulations.
After examining federal privacy protection and various state and
federal cases, the court decided not to resolve the case on federal
grounds because of the unsettled state of the privacy issue at the
federal level. The Breese court instead decided that "avoidance of
81. As noted in an earlier Alaska privacy rights case, these concerns include
a desire for the "preservation of maximum individual choice, protection of
minority sentiments, and appreciation for divergent lifestyles." Breese v. Smith,
501 P.2d 159, 169 (Alaska 1972).
82. For a ten-year perspective on the development of the right to privacy in
Alaska, see John F. Grossbauer, Note, Alaska's Right to Privacy Ten Years After
Ravin v. State: Developing a Jurisprudence of Privacy, 2 ALASKA L. REV. 159
(1985).
83. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1985).
84. 501 P.2d 159 (Alaska 1972).
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
the federal thicket [was] the better course,"' and struck down the
regulations on independent state grounds. Citing a general liberty
right under article I, section 1 of the state constitution, 6 and
noting the state's duty to open and maintain public schools,' the
court found that the student had a "fundamental... right to select
[his] own individual hair style[] without governmental direction."'
It then determined that the state's interest in maintaining the
regulation was insufficiently "compelling" to overcome the
student's privacy right.89
The Breese court examined cases from federal and state courts
as well as notes and articles by various commentators.9" Citing
Roberts v. State9 and Baker v. City of Fairbanks,' the court
characterized its decision as a matter of fulfilling its judicial
obligation to move forward and develop additional rights under the
state constitution without being constrained by federal decisions.'
Breese therefore set the stage for the development of the right to
privacy law under the explicit language of section 22.
In 1975 the Alaska Supreme Court decided the first major case
under the 1972 privacy amendment. In Ravin v. State,94 the court
recognized the fundamental right to privacy in one's home. In
reviewing a state statute that prohibited the possession of marijua-
na by an adult for personal use in the home, the court inquired
whether the statute was designed to accomplish a legitimate
governmental interest and whether the means chosen bore a close
and substantial relationship to that interest.
After an extensive review of the available scientific evi-
dence,96 the court found that the potential harm was not great
85. Id. at 166.
86. Id. at 166-67; see ALASKA CONsT. art. I, § 1, set forth in the Appendix.
87. Breese, 501 P.2d at 174.
88. Id. at 169.
89. Id. at 174.
90. See, e.g., id. at 166 n.26.
91. 458 P.2d 340 (Alaska 1969).
92. 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970).
93. See Breese, 501 P.2d at 166-67.
94. 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
95. Id. at 504.
96. As part of its analysis, the court considered evidence, including the state's
justifications that marijuana is a psychoactive drug, it is harmful, heavy use entails
a concomitant risk, it is capable of precipitating a psychotic reaction in at least
some circumstances and its use adversely affects the user's ability to operate an
automobile. Id. at 504-11.
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enough to show a close and substantial relationship between the
state's interest in public welfare and marijuana use in the home.'
However, the court did not find constitutional protection for the
buying or selling of marijuana, the use of marijuana in a public
place, or the possession of a large amount of marijuana at home.98
Furthermore, the court did not hold that the possession or ingestion
of marijuana was a fundamental right itself; rather, the court found
that the privacy of one's home afforded protection from this type
of governmental intrusion.99
In his concurring opinion in Ravin, Justice Boochever noted
that federal privacy law was particularly unsettled and, citing Baker
v. City of Fairbanks,"° argued that it was therefore appropriate
for the court to use independence and initiative in interpreting the
privacy provision of the state constitution. °1 He also urged a
broader interpretation than that found under the United States
Constitution because, unlike the United States Constitution, "the
citizens of Alaska, with their emphasis on individual liberty,
enacted an amendment to the Alaska Constitution expressly
providing for a right to privacy not found in the United States
Constitution."'" To achieve such broad protection, Justice
97. Id. at 511.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 504. In 1990, Alaskans approved an initiative for a new statute
recriminalizing the possession of marijuana in a private location. The 1990
Elections: State by State, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1990, at B9. The resultant statute,
see ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.060 (Supp. 1994), while not yet before the state
supreme court, would probably survive a constitutional challenge on the same
grounds as the cocaine regulation in Erickson. New evidence as to the dangers of
marijuana produced during the initiative drive has changed the balance from that
present in 1975, when Ravin was decided.
Interestingly, Professor Gardner cites the Ravin case and the subsequent
1990 initiative for the proposition that "the Alaskan character for rugged
individuality did not hold out for long against the nationwide hardening in
attitudes against drug use." Gardner, supra note 2, at 828 n.283. Perhaps if
Gardner had examined the constitutional development surrounding this issue, he
might have seen the case and initiative as part of a lively constitutional discourse
rather than a sign of Alaskans' lost individuality.
100. 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970).
101. See Ravin, 537 P.2d at 513 (Boochever, J., concurring).
102. Id. at 514-15. The Ravin majority also noted the unique lifestyle in Alaska:
Our territory and now state has traditionally been the home of people
who prize their individuality and who have chosen to settle or continue
to live here in order to achieve a measure of control over their own
lifestyles which is now virtually unattainable in many of our other sister
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Boochever argued for the use of "a single flexible test,"' 3 which
was, in reality, a sliding-scale analysis.
A follow-up case to Ravin was decided by the Alaska Supreme
Court in 1978. In State v. Erickson,"°4 the court ruled on whether
the ingestion of cocaine in the home was protected by the right to
privacy. The court's approach was substantially similar to the
sliding-scale test used to address equal protection issues. 5 The
test balances the infringing governmental conduct with the privacy
interest in question. In Erickson, the privacy interest was similar
to the one previously addressed in Ravin because it involved the
use of illicit drugs in the defendant's own home.10 6 In Erickson,
however, the drug in question was cocaine rather than marijuana.
The court found the dangers presented by cocaine to exceed those
posed by marijuana use. 7 Accordingly, the drug user's privacy
interest was outweighed by the societal need to regulate the
demonstrated dangers of cocaine.'08
In the area of informational privacy, the Alaska Supreme
Court has also employed a balancing test that appears to be yet
another form of the sliding-scale standard. For example, in the
1977 case of Falcon v. Alaska Public Offices Commission,"° a
doctor challenged the requirement that he, as a member of a school
board, had to release a list of the names of his patients to the
commission. The court found that, while the doctor did not have
a personal privacy stake in the list, the patients did."0 The court
balanced the state's interest in promoting fair and honest govern-
states.
Id. at 504 (majority opinion).
103. Id. at 515 (Boochever, J., concurring).
104. 574 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1978).
105. See supra part IV.A.
106. See Erickson, 574 P.2d at 21.
107. Id. at 21-22.
108. While the discourse regarding the standards for equal protection and
privacy claims has been complicated by cases raising both issues, the standards that
have emerged are very similar, that is, a balancing test in both instances. The
standard for equal protection claims as articulated in Alaska Pacific Assurance Co.
v. Brown, 687 P.2d 264, 269-70 (Alaska 1984), is the substantial equivalent of the
privacy test laid out in Erickson, namely, "[w]here the right to privacy is
manifested in terms of interests more squarely within personal autonomy, the
balance requires a heavier burden on the State to sustain the legislation in light
of the right involved." Erickson, 574 P.2d at 22 n.144.
109. 570 P.2d 469 (Alaska 1977).
110. See id. at 478-79.
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ment with the patients' interest in concealing their identity and held
that, until the state's means to its valid purpose provided some
form of screening, the regulation must be suspended."' More-
over, in more recent cases involving information and privacy, the
court has cited the Falcon balancing approach in applying a
"compelling interest" test. The test applied in these privacy cases,
however, is not the old two-prong test, but rather reflects a
balancing approach as used in Falcon."'
Privacy law in Alaska is still developing. With respect to
privacy in the home, a balancing or sliding-scale type of test is
fairly well established. Nevertheless, in areas such as informational
privacy, the court appears to be working to develop a balancing
analysis."' Alaska's discourse on the right to privacy reflects
both the state's independence and its unique tradition of emphasiz-
ing individual liberties. Alaska's discourse concerning privacy
111. Id. at 480.
112. See Messerli v. State, 626 P.2d 81 (Alaska 1980) (challenging campaign
disclosure law on privacy, free speech and free press grounds). With this
combination of rights, the Messerli court applied a strict compelling interest
standard on the state's interest in general. The court held that the disclosures
could be required only if adequate procedural safeguards were established. In
discussing privacy, the court cited Breese for the proposition that the right to
privacy is not absolute. Id. at 84. Given the combination of rights involved,
Messerli can be viewed to illustrate balancing at the upper end or compelling
interest level of review. The case also illustrates several areas where the Alaska
constitution provides broader protections than the United States Constitution. Md
at 83.
State v. Oliver, 636 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1981) also illustrates the court's
application of a compelling interest test by balancing the privacy interests of a tax
protestor claiming that a state requirement for the filing of a W-2 form violated
the state right to privacy. The Oliver court noted that the information was neither
highly sensitive nor intended to be kept confidential, and the court therefore
concluded that the state's interest outweighed the protestor's. Id. at 1167-68. The
court used language similar to that found in Falcon regarding the balancing of
interests. Id. at 1167.
113. Criminal procedure as well as search and seizure law are related to the
privacy issue. Both these areas of Alaska law are developing separately from the
privacy issues discussed above. However, it is noteworthy for this discussion that
even in the criminal context, the Alaska Supreme Court has used section 22 to
exclude a warrantless wireless recording, even though such a recording would be
admissible under the federal constitution. State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872 (Alaska
1978). In doing so, the court stated that section 22 "affords broader protection
than the penumbral right inferred from other [federal and state] constitutional
provisions. Were that not the case, there would have been no need to amend the
constitution." Id. at 879 (footnotes omitted).
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rights has involved not only an examination of the right itself but
also the development of the test for judicial evaluation of the right.
In cultivating this discourse, Alaska exemplifies the essence of NJF
as well as the benefits of departing from the federal path.
C. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is an important and illuminating area of
Alaska's constitutional jurisprudence. As described in Professor
Steven K. Green's 1988 article in the Alaska Law Review, Freedom
of Religion in Alaska: Interpreting the Alaska Constitution,"4 the
constitutional discourse regarding religious freedom has developed
on two primary fronts. First, the Alaska Supreme Court has
interpreted the constitution's "free exercise" clause" 5 broadly,
thus affording a high degree of protection. In contrast, a more
restrictive view is evident under the "establishment" clause.116
The role of religion in Alaska is also mentioned in other parts of
the state constitution. For example, the preamble to the constitu-
tion proclaims gratitude to God and states that one purpose of the
constitution is "to secure and transmit to succeeding generations
the heritage of political, civil and religious liberty within the Union
of States.",11
7
The free exercise standard in Alaska was enunciated in Frank
v. State,"8 a case involving some uniquely Alaskan facts. Follow-
ing the death of an Athabascan native in a central Alaskan village,
preparations were made by the villagers for a funeral potlatch."'
Carlos Frank and other villagers formed hunting parties for the
purpose of taking a moose for the potlatch. One cow moose was
taken and Frank assisted in bringing it to the village. At the time
of the taking, moose were out of season. Moreover, there was no
season at all for cow moose that year. Frank admitted his part in
the moose-taking, claimed that the game regulations were an
114. Green, supra note 51 (providing an in-depth view of Alaskan freedom of
religion in a constitutional context).
115. ALASKA CoNsT. art. I, § 4.
116. Id.
117. Id. pmbl.
118. 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979).
119. The funeral potlatch is a traditional "ceremony of several days' duration
culminating in a feast eaten after burial of the deceased, which is shared by
members of the village and others who come from sometimes distant locations."
Id. at 1069. Burial is delayed until the participants can gather. Id.
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abridgment of his freedom of religion, but was nonetheless
convicted.' 2°
The Alaska Supreme Court reversed Frank's conviction,
finding first that article I, section 4 of the state constitution and the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution protected
Frank's conduct.12 1 The court further found that the state failed
to demonstrate reasons that justified prohibiting Frank's conduct in
light of these protections." The court found that the freedom
to believe is absolute and that the freedom to act on one's religious
beliefs may be controlled by the state only on the basis of a
compelling state interest.'2 While the decision discussed and, to
some degree, incorporated federal First Amendment analysis, the
court placed great weight on the specifics of the Alaskan way of
life, such as Athabascafi customs and the tradition of hunting
regulation.' 24
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1071-73.
122. Id. at 1073-75. This decision was based on agreement with the United
States Supreme Court's standard for exempting religious activities from generally
applicable laws as outlined in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). The Yoder
test requires that (1) religion is involved, (2) the conduct is religiously based and
(3) the claimant is sincere. Id. at 215-16.
123. Frank, 604 P.2d at 1070, 1073. The compelling state interest must rise to
the level of protection from a "'substantial threat to public safety, peace or
order."' Id. at 1070 (quoting Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963)).
124. While the court noted no absolute religious right other than the right to
hold the belief itself, it reviewed the extensive record regarding the Athabascan
beliefs and, specifically, the funeral potlatch. Id. at 1071-73. The court found that
the facts of the moose hunt in Frank's case met the three prongs of the Yoder test.
In particular, the court noted that the trial court's finding that the moose meat was
not essential was subject to question. Likening the moose meat to the wine and
wafer of Christian sacraments, the court found that absolute necessity was not the
standard to be followed. Id. at 1072. A deeply rooted religious belief was
sufficient to bring a practice within the protection of the free exercise clause. Id.
at 1072-73. The court also noted that "[t]he determination of orthodoxy is not the
business of a secular court." Id. at 1073 (citations omitted).
The court then examined the interests claimed by the state. The game
resources of Alaska were recognized as valuable and unique, such that the state
had an interest in a healthy moose population. Id. However, the court looked at
whether an exemption for Frank's activity would cause this interest to suffer and
noted that the state did not argue that a religious exception would result in the
taking of a biologically significant number of moose. Id. at 1073-74.
The court also rejected the state's claim that an exemption would result in
widespread civil disobedience regarding game laws because of the sensitivity of
game allocation in the state. The court found this argument too speculative to
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Frank signifies that the Alaskan right to the free exercise of
religion has the weight to withstand even the challenge of an
important government interest. This is confirmed by subsequent
decisions. For example, the court has ruled that an employee
cannot be forced to pay union dues if such payment violates the
employee's religious beliefs."z  The court reasoned that the
employee should not be fired but rather should be allowed to remit
the dues amount to a charity.'26 The free exercise clause also
prevents the government from discriminating because of religious
beliefs." 7
On the other hand, as pointed out in Frank, the right to
religious practice is not absolute under the Alaskan constitution.
In Seward Chapel, Inc. v. City of Seward," zoning ordinances
forbidding the operation of a school on church property were
upheld because the school was not entitled to an exemption to a
facially neutral law. As noted by Professor Green, the key to this
decision was the fact that the desire to operate the school was not
based on a religious tenet but rather on convenience and economic
concerns. 29 The court therefore found that the zoning ordinance
was reasonable and not an infringement on the freedom of
religion.30 In contrast, Green observed, recent federal cases
constrain the freedom of religion. Id. It also rejected the state's claim that an
exemption would amount to the establishment of a religion in contravention of the
establishment clauses of the federal and state constitutions. The court held that
the purpose of these clauses is to prevent state sponsorship, financial support and
active involvement in religious matters. An exemption for funeral moose hunts,
in the court's view, did not rise to that level. Id. at 1074-75. Citing regulations
from other states with religious accommodations as examples, the court suggested
that the state coufd carefully design regulations to accommodate the state's game
management and other concerns without infringing on religious freedoms. Id. at
1075.
125. Wonzell v. Alaska Wood Products, Inc., 601 P. 2d 584, 585 (Alaska 1979).
126. Id. at 585.
127. In 1968, the Alaska Supreme Court ruled that belief in a supreme being
is not required for competency of a witness at trial. Flores v. State, 443 P.2d 73,
77-78 (Alaska 1968). The Alaska Supreme Court has also held that the consider-
ation of the mother's religious beliefs in a child custody case would impermissibly
violate her right to free exercise of religion. Johnson v. Johnson, 504 P.2d 71
(Alaska 1977).
128. 655 P.2d 1293 (Alaska 1982).
129. See Green, supra note 51, at 248.
130. Seward Chapel, 655 P.2d at 1302; see also Hearning v. Eason, 739 P.2d 167
(Alaska 1987). The Hearning court held that the Alaska Nonprofit Corporation
Act applied to a dispute over the tenure of a Baptist minister in Fairbanks,
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demonstrate that the freedom to practice one's religion may be
more limited under the federal constitution than under the Alaska
constitution.'
The state establishment clause has been the source of litigation
in several contexts. The main area of dispute has been aid to
sectarian institutions. Another contentious area is that of govern-
mental favoritism. While not part of the Declaration of Rights, two
other provisions of the Alaska constitution are often considered in
conjunction with establishment clause questions. The first prohibits
direct benefits to religion;132 the second prohibits tax money or
appropriations from being used in any way other than for a public
purpose.
The first case addressing the issue of aid to religion was
decided in 1961, not long after statehood. In Matthews v. Quin-
ton," 4 the Alaska Supreme Court specifically rejected the federal
approach 35 and found that the state establishment clause prohib-
ited state-funded transportation for parochial school students. 36
Alaska. The issue was whether the Act, which allowed proxy voting, applied to
church business meetings in the absence of a contrary proxy provision in the
church bylaws. The court found that the church had failed to support its claim
that proxy voting violated its religious rules. Id. at 169. The court's decision
appears similar to the neutral principles approach followed in federal courts. See
Green, supra note 51, at 249. Most recently, the Alaska Supreme Court held that
a landlord's religious views regarding marriage were not protected by the state
freedom of religion clause to the extent that the landlord was not permitted to
discriminate against unmarried tenants. See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights
Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska 1994).
131. See Green, supra note 51, at 258 n.9 (citing O'Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S.
342 (1987) (finding that freedom of religion does not require special Islamic
worshipping privileges in state prisons)); see also Employment Div., Or. Dep't of
Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (refusing to extend federal
constitutional protection to the religious use of peyote by American Indians); Lyng
v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (denying a
religious freedom claim that sought to prevent logging on Indian burial grounds).
132. See ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1.
133. See id. art. IX, § 6.
134. 362 P.2d 932 (Alaska 1961).
135. The federal approach to aid to religious schools is contained in Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
136. Matthews, 362 P.2d at 942-43. Interestingly, this case arose when a student
at a parochial school, who had been receiving free transportation under a
territorial statute, brought suit to force the continued practice when local officials
refused to provide the free transportation after statehood. Id. at 933-34. The
Alaska Supreme Court found that the transportation was a direct benefit to the
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
Professor Green pointed out that two years later the court relaxed
its interpretation. 37 In a decision written by Justice Dimond, the
dissenter in Matthews, the Alaska Supreme Court held that a
hospital building erected with federal, state and local funds could
be leased for ten years at one dollar per year to a non-profit
religious corporation.'38 The court looked at the arrangement as
a simple agreement with a charitable corporation designed to serve
the public interest. The fact that the charity was religious in
orientation did not change the service to the public. 39 This
decision suggested a more accommodating approach to the public
purpose aspect of the establishment issue.
This suggestion, however, did not precipitate a movement
toward relaxing the separation between church and state in Alaska.
In Sheldon Jackson College v. State, 4' the court set up a four-part
test to assist in clarifying the hazy line between direct and indirect
benefits. The test involved (1) the breadth of class benefitted, (2)
the nature of the use of the funds, (3) the magnitude of the
religious benefit and (4) whether the program merely acted as a
channel for the religious organization. 4' The tuition assistance
program at Sheldon Jackson College, a private school, failed on all
counts and was rejected by the court as violative of the direct
benefit provision of the state constitution.4
The Alaska Supreme Court addressed the issue of governmen-
tal promotion of, or detrimental action toward, a particular religion
in a 1979 child custody dispute. In Bonjour v. Bonjour,'43 the
court ruled that the awarding of custody to a father solely because
of religious beliefs was impermissible under the establishment
clause.'" According to the court, trial courts must remain strictly
neutral as to a child's religious needs. This result paralleled the
caution against court involvement in determining orthodoxy noted
earlier in Frank v. State.'45
parochial school and that the activity was not for a public purpose. Id. at 940-41.
137. Green, supra note 51, at 250.
138. Lien v. City of Ketchikan, 383 P.2d 721 (Alaska 1963).
139. Id. at 724.
140. 599 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1979).
141. Id. at 130.
142. Id. at 131-32.
143. 592 P.2d 1233 (Alaska 1979).
144. Id. at 1241-44.
145. 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979).
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Finally, religion presents another related issue under the
Alaska constitution. Unlike the federal and many state constitu-
tions, Alaska's constitution mandates a tax exemption for religious
property and specifically grants the legislature broad powers in
defining exempt entities."4  Many cases in this area involve
application of the legislature's requirement that the property be
used exclusively for a religious purpose. For example, the court
held that a church-owned radio station that sold some commercial
air time did not qualify under the exclusive-use requirement even
though profits were used for church purposes. 47 The require-
ments for this tax exemption are therefore strictly construed by the
court and involve some consideration of the establishment clause
analysis.'
In summary, the Alaska Supreme Court has, on the one hand,
given the state free exercise clause a broad reading. The standard
set in Frank, originally based on the court's reading of both state
and federal constitutional provisions, provides strict protection for
the exercise of religion. This protective interpretation has
continued even in light of less protective First Amendment
decisions by the United States Supreme Court. In contrast, the
Alaska Supreme Court has ruled against assistance to religion
under a rather strict interpretation of the establishment clause.
Assistance that the federal courts would generally allow has been
rejected on more than one occasion. Additionally, in its tax
exemption rulings the Alaska Supreme Court has narrowly
construed the exemption when it is used for religious purposes.
Taken together, these interpretations evidence a clear and
consistent stand for the separation of church and state in the
Alaskan discourse on religious freedom.
While the Alaska Supreme Court frequently cites federal cases,
the Alaskan discourse is Alaska-centered and not bound by the
federal approach, an approach in a well-documented state of
146. See ALAsKA CoNsT. art IX, § 4.
147. Evangelical Covenant Church of Am. v. Nome, 394 P.2d 882 (Alaska
1964).
148. See Green, supra note 51, at 254-57. In Greater Anchorage Area Borough
v. Sisters of Charity of House of Providence, 553 P.2d 467 (Alaska 1976), the court
established the general standard to be applied in evaluating tax exemption cases,
namely, (1) that the exemption is narrowly construed, (2) that the taxpayer has the
burden and the exemption is not automatic but dependent on an affirmative
showing, and (3) that both the actual use and the owner's use are considered in
the exclusive use determination. Id. at 469-70.
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disarray.'49 Alaska's example reflects a constitutional protection
for religion that is consistently based on the separation of the state
from any religion. This consistency is in sharp contrast to the
flounderings of the federal courts. Alaska's independence in the
area of religious freedom may well provide future guidance on
issues such as school prayer and financing that continue to loom on
the nation's horizon.
As Professor Green points out, religious rights and diversity
are important traditions in Alaska. 5  This is seen in the constitu-
tional discourse on the Alaskan freedom of religion. Green's
comments summarize the results of this discourse:
Through these decisions, the Alaska court has guaranteed the
right of people to practice their beliefs, religious or otherwise,
free from government intrusion or oversight. Religious organiza-
tions are free to proselytize while disbelievers are spared the
burden of adhering to a particular system of belief. Further-
more, abstaining from supporting or endorsing religion, govern-
ment allows religion to flourish on its own. This is what Thomas
Jefferson intended when he wrote that "religion is a matter
which lies solely between man and his God."'
D. Natural Resource Rights'
Article VIII of the Alaska constitution, entitled Natural
Resources, is unique among state and federal constitutions. This
article was born out of the realization by those at the 1956 Alaska
Constitutional Convention that the state's future would depend on
the successful development of all of its natural resources."'
Article VIII is not only long and detailed, but definitely pro-
development in orientation. However, the convention delegates
were also concerned with ensuring that development was for the
long-term benefit of Alaska's people, in essence viewing natural
149. As Professor Mark Tushnet confirms in his thoughtful book on interpreta-
tion of the United States Constitution, including the disarray surrounding the
freedom of religion at that level, "contemporary constitutional law just does not
know how to handle problems of religion." MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND
BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTrrTIONAL LAW 248 (1988).
150. Green, supra note 51, at 237.
151. Id. at 260 (citation omitted).
152. Much of the following discussion parallels the analysis in Stephen M.
White, "Equal Access" to Alaska's Fish and Wildlife, 11 ALASKA L. REV. 277
(1994).
153. See FISCHER, supra note 26, at 129-30.
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resources as a public trust.154 These two concerns are reflected
in several sections of article VIII. 5 Given the importance of
natural resources to the state and the resultant constitutional
embodiment of these concerns, it is not surprising that the use and
protection of natural resources has become a significant part of
Alaska's constitutional discourse. This is particularly true of recent
decisions by the Alaska Supreme Court. This discourse has taken
154. See HARRISON, supra note 26, at 150. E.L. ("Bob") Bartlett, Alaska's pre-
statehood delegate to Congress, delivered the keynote address at the opening of
the Alaska Constitutional Convention on November 8, 1955. In his address,
Bartlett urged the delegates to address the natural resources of Alaska because
they would be "writ[ing] on a clean slate in the field of resources policy... [and,
therefore, they had] an opportunity to establish resources policy geared to the
growth of a magnificent economy and the welfare of a people." FISCHER, supra
note 26, at 26 (quoting Alaska Legislative Council, Alaska Constitutional
Convention Proceedings, Part 6, Appendix 11 (1965)).
155. Article VIII provides, in pertinent part:
Section 1. Statement of Policy
It is the policy of the State to encourage the settlement of its land and
the development of its resources by making them available for maximum
use consistent with the public interest.
Section 2. General Authority
The legislature shall provide for the utilization, development, and
conservation of all natural resources belonging to the state, including land
and waters, for the maximum benefit of its people.
Section 3. Common Use
Wherever occurring in their natural state, fish, wildlife, and waters are
reserved to the people for common use.
Section 4. Sustained Yield
Fish, forests, wildlife, grasslands and all other replenishable resources
belonging to the State shall be utilized, developed, and maintained on the
sustainable yield principle, subject to preferences among beneficial uses.
Section 15. No Exclusive Right of Fishery
No exclusive right or special privilege of fishery shall be created or
authorized in the natural waters of the State. This section does not
restrict the power of the State to limit entry into any fishery for purposes
of resource conservation, to prevent economic distress among fishermen
and those dependent upon them for a livelihood and to promote the
efficient development of aquaculture in the State.
Section 16. Protection of Rights
No person shall be involuntarily divested of his right to the use of waters,
his interest in lands, or improvements affecting either, except for a
superior beneficial use or public purpose and then only with just
compensation and by operation of law.
Section 17. Uniform Application
Laws and regulations governing the use or disposal of natural resources
shall apply equally to all persons similarly situated with reference to the
subject matter and purpose to be served by the law or regulation.
ALASKA CONST. art. VIII., §§ 1-4, 15-17.
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place largely in a vacuum at the federal constitutional level and has
centered primarily on the unique characteristics of the Alaska
constitution.
With respect to the basic thrust of article VIII, the Alaska
Supreme Court addressed the seeming contradiction between
development and conservation in the 1981 case of Kenai Peninsula
Fisherman's Cooperative Ass'n v. State.156  In Kenai Peninsula,
the court ruled that the terms "conserving" and "developing" both
embody concepts of utilization of resources. 7  The court's
definition attempted to provide compatibility in viewing conserva-
tion as controlled utilization that is designed to prevent exploita-
tion, destruction or neglect and, at the same time, viewing develop-
ment as management to make a resource available for use. 5'
In Alaska Fish Spotters Ass'n v. State Department of Fish &
Game,'59 the Alaska Supreme Court further developed this area
of constitutional discourse when it reviewed a claim by aerial fish
spotters that state regulations violated their constitutional rights
under article VIII. Specifically, the fish spotters claimed that the
ban violated section 3's common use rights, section 15's no
exclusive use right, section 17's uniform application clause, and
article I, section l's equal protection clause. The court rejected the
plaintiff's common use claim based on article VIII, section 2's
authority to conserve the natural resources of Alaska. 6 ' It also
rejected the remainder of the claims, stating that the regulation was
applicable to all citizens and did not create an exclusive use or a
special privilege. 6'
Highlighting the importance of Alaska's unique constitutional
development, the three sections of article VIII examined in Alaska
Fish Spotters Ass'n are collectively known as the natural resource
"equal access clauses."'62  These provisions are frequently dis-
cussed together, especially when examining proper resource
management or distributing the "preferences among beneficial
uses" noted in article VIII, section 4.163 Accordingly, much of the
156. 628 P.2d 897 (1981).
157. Id. at 903.
158. Id.
159. 838 P.2d 798 (Alaska 1992).
160. Id. at 802.
161. Id. at 803-04.
162. White, supra note 152, at 277.
163. See, e.g., Tongass Sport Fishing Ass'n v. State, 866 P.2d 1314,1318 (Alaska
1994) (upholding a regulation allocating the number of chinook salmon harvested
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constitutional discourse relating to natural resources involves
allocation schemes intended to balance natural resource use and
conservation.
An example of a recent attempt to strike this balance came in
Owsichek v. State Guide Licensing and Control Board."6 Ow-
sichek involved a game management scheme in which a limited
number of guides would be granted exclusive licenses to lead
hunting expeditions in designated "exclusive guide areas."'65 The
Alaska Supreme Court determined that the scheme struck an
impermissible balance between resource use and conservation by
running afoul of the "anti-monopoly" spirit of the common use
clause in article VIII, section 3166 The court indicated that
resources could permissibly be allocated and controlled; 67 howev-
er, any allocation scheme must be consistent with the common law
principles constitutionalized in article VIII which "impos[e] upon
the state a public trust duty with regard to the management of fish,
wildlife and waters.', 1
68
Other types of resource allocation schemes have been
reviewed and approved under article VIII. For example, allocation
of salmon between commercial interests and sport fishermen was
upheld in Kenai Peninsula.'69 In addition, fishing regulations
affecting gear types and participation in different fisheries have
been challenged under the natural resources equal access claus-
es.170  The Alaska Supreme Court upheld such regulatory
by commercial and sport fishers as not violative of the equal access clauses
because the mandate of the Board of Fisheries was a "managed utilization" of
resources, which includes the ability to allocate resources among beneficial uses).
164. 763 P.2d 488 (Alaska 1988).
165. Id. at 489.
166. Id. at 496.
167. Id. at 492.
168. Id. at 493.
169. 628 P.2d 897, 899 (Alaska 1981).
170. Natural resource management schemes that limit the number of
participants are commonly used in Alaska. However, such schemes were not
considered constitutional under the original language of article VIII, section 15.
State v. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184, 1189 (Alaska 1983). In 1972 an amendment to
the state constitution added to section 15 the current second sentence, which
authorizes limited-entry types of management. Id. at 1188. An effort to repeal
the law implementing the amendment failed in 1976. In 1983 the law survived
constitutional scrutiny. Id- at 1190.
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schemes in Meier v. State Board of Fisheries... and State v. Her-
bert.172  Finally, in Gilbert v. State Department of Fish &
Game, 3 different catch allocations for neighboring districts were
found permissible under the equal access provisions because the
districts, while similar in location, were biologically not similarly
situated.174
A 1994 article by Stephen M. White in the Alaska Law
Review" explored the development of the constitutional dis-
course relating to the three natural resource equal access sections.
Mr. White's analysis, which detailed the judicial development in
this important area of Alaska law, reached a conclusion with a
familiar theme: "The equal access clauses are unique to Alaska's
constitution and ... [are] based on established, historic principles
arising under the public trust doctrine, pre-statehood fish and
wildlife management policy and equal protection analysis.' 7 6
Invariably, the discourse regarding the Alaska constitution
turns to Alaska itself. Without a functional NJF approach,
essential elements of Alaskan life would be lost in the process of
constitutional interpretation. Article VIII reflects a unique aspect
of Alaska-its natural resources and the concern of Alaskans for
resource conservation and development. This concern for the
natural resources of Alaska is reflected in Alaskan constitutional
discourse.
E. Alaska's Discourse and Professor Gardner's Criticism
To a large degree, Professor Gardner's criticism of state
constitutional discourse centers on the linkage between state and
federal constitutional jurisprudence."r He claims that the state
courts have turned to their own constitutions grudgingly and with
little enthusiasm for specifying independent state constitutional
171. 739 P.2d 172, 175 (Alaska 1987) (upholding a regulation requiring salmon
fishermen in the Bristol Bay area who wished to transfer from one district to
another to register in the new district at least 48 hours before transferring and
cease fishing during that 48-hour period).
172. 803 P.2d 863, 867 (Alaska 1990) (upholding a regulation creating "super-
exclusive" use fisheries and preventing fishermen from operating in more than one
such fishery).
173. 803 P.2d 391 (Alaska 1990).
174. Id. at 399-400.
175. White, supra note 152.
176. Id. at 299.
177. See Gardner, supra note 2, at 804.
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bases for their decisions.78 Professor Gardner's chief criticism,
therefore, is that the states are not really independent constitutional
actors. This criticism misses the mark with respect to Alaska.
While it is true that the Alaska cases reviewed herein have
generally considered federal law as a starting point for constitution-
al adjudications, for a number of reasons this approach is neither
surprising nor debilitating to a valid constitutional discourse. First,
in most of these cases, the litigants are entitled to both federal and
state constitutional protections. This is particularly true in the
equal protection, privacy and freedom of religion contexts. The
court necessarily considers both constitutional levels because, to
one extent or another, both constitutions address these claims.
However, this in no way renders the resultant discourse any less
legitimate. Quite to the contrary, the Alaskan discourse reflects
the complexity of constitutional law in a federal system.
The interplay between state and federal constitutional texts in
equal protection, privacy and freedom of religion cases contrasts
with the constitutional analysis of natural resources issues. The
lack of discussion of federal constitutional matters in the natural
resources area reflects the fact that resource matters are not
addressed at the federal level in any way similar to other individual
rights concerns. A state such as Alaska will therefore generally
decide resources issues without resorting to federal constitutional
law.
Alaska also has a rather unique history in that, in its territorial
days, the federal Bill of Rights was fully applicable. 79 Therefore,
part of Alaska's constitutional history has always been federal. On
the other hand, when Alaskans drafted their own constitution it
was not a carbon copy of the federal version. The early constitu-
tional interpretation cases discussed above 8° examined the role
of federal constitutional history in the interpretation of the state
constitution. The clear result was an approach that considered
federal constitutional law, yet understood it as distinct from state
constitutional law.
Another significant factor noted in Alaska's state constitutional
discourse is the disarray of federal law in several significant areas
that has necessitated reliance on state constitutional analysis. The
178. Id. at 781-94.
179. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
180. See supra part III.
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federal two-tiered equal protection test is a prime example of
federal protection becoming mired in an approach that has been
the subject of criticism and dissent.'81 While Professor Gardner
might challenge the Alaska sliding-scale test as merely an opportu-
nistic, results-oriented adoption of Justice Marshall's views of equal
protection jurisprudence, quite the opposite is true. Review of the
discourse associated with this test reveals a long process of
development. The ultimate catalyst for Alaska's independent equal
protection test was the need for a method of protecting interests
that were not necessarily fundamental at the federal level but,
nonetheless, valued and important in Alaska. It is perhaps
particularly significant that several of the cases crucial to the
development of Alaska's equal protection approach, of which
Isakson v. Rickey" and State v. Ostrosky'"' are examples, in-
volved natural resources.
Similarly, Alaska's right to privacy has progressed from
rejecting the "federal thicket" in Breese v Smith, to recognizing an
Alaskan liberty right to be "let alone," to the adoption of a specific
right to privacy in the Alaska Constitution. As with the equal
protection cases, the Alaska right to privacy is applied through a
balancing of the interests involved in any particular case. Also, as
seen in Frank v. State,"8 Alaska's discourse regarding the state
freedom of religion begins with the First Amendment. However,
as federal law moves away from a particular point, state law need
not necessarily follow. A state may begin with a federally
described test and use it to interpret independent state constitution-
al principles.
These cases illustrate that Alaska, far from grudgingly, has
actively adopted its own way of interpreting its constitution. Part
of that method has been to build on the federal discourse that is
undeniably part of its own unique constitutional history. Professor
Gardner may be correct in making two particular criticisms of NJ.
First, state courts appear to be remiss in failing to delineate clearly
the basis of their decisions." The Erickson case, with its inter-
play of equal protection and privacy, is an example of difficulty in
this area. Second, courts sometimes do not designate whether the
181. See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
182. 550 P.2d 359 (Alaska 1976).
183. 667 P.2d 1184 (Alaska 1983).
184. 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979).
185. See Gardner, supra note 2, at 785.
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basis for a particular decision is derived from federal or state
constitutional protections." Frank, for example, could be clearer
in this regard. However, on the main, Alaska's discourse has
clearly illustrated an early willingness to approach state constitu-
tional interpretation independently. Perfection is not required;
instead, progress and development are the goals of discourse."
V. CONCLUSION
The New Judicial Federalism is alive and well in Alaska.
While this survey covers only four areas of Alaska law governing
individual rights, these areas clearly demonstrate that the Alaska
Supreme Court has, for some time, been dedicated to a principled
discourse focused on the protection of individual rights under the
state constitution. The development of independent standards in
these areas is a clear example of the results of an ongoing dis-
course. Moreover, these results have been achieved through a
discourse that is in many ways rather young. After all, Alaska has
only been a state for less than forty years.
Since Alaska's recent past is that of a federal territory, it is
natural that federal decisions are initially referenced for guidance
in most areas of the law. Additionally, the supremacy of federal
law necessitates some inquiry into whether any federal provisions
apply. However, the Alaska Supreme Court has never shied away
from referring to a wide variety of sources for guidance in reaching
its decisions. Instead, the law of other states and even English law
are often cited in the court's constitutional opinions.
Regarding the views expressed by Professor Gardner, I submit
that he is wrong about NJF, particularly with respect to Alaska,
and he may well be wrong about other states as well. The Alaskan
experience outlined above rebuts Gardner's arguments that Ameri-
cans are national and not state oriented, that state constitutions do
not define a distinctive coherent way of life, and that state
186. Id.
187. See Robert F. Utter, State Constitutional Law, the United States Supreme
Court, and Democratic Accountability: Is There a Crocodile in the Bathtub?, 64
WASH. L. REV. 19, 44-49 (1989). Justice Utter notes that Justice Brandeis's
dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting), designates the states as laboratories for the federal system and finds
Brandeis's view to be a compelling argument for independent state analysis. Utter
also argues that the United States Supreme Court can learn from such independent
analysis. Utter, supra, at 47.
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constitutionalism is not compatible with a national constitution.'
The cases discussed herein demonstrate that Alaska's constitutional
discourse, while always mindful of the federal approach, is indepen-
dent and has been independent since Alaska's early days of
statehood.
Not only does location set Alaska apart from the rest of the
nation, but the unique day-to-day activities of Alaskans often
impact state constitutional interpretation. Many of the cases
discussed in this article could only arise in Alaska. Alaska's diverse
population, with its mix of new and old immigrants and various
clans of Indian and Eskimo peoples, forms a distinctive social fabric
that, when combined with its geographic distance from the rest of
the United States, demands a strong state orientation.
If one thing is clear about the Alaska constitution, it is that it
was designed for the future of a state that would depend on the
development of its natural resources. The state constitution is
therefore tailored for Alaska. In particular, article VIII is much
more than a novelty; its principles are tested every day. Often the
important cases involving individual rights have also involved
natural resources. For example, Frank in the freedom of religion
area and Isakson in the equal protection area both arose as
disputes over the use of natural resources. The Alaska constitution
was thus designed for the type of people who would settle in the
state and reflects the value they place upon individual freedom.
Finally, Professor Gardner is also mistaken regarding the
compatibility of the federal and state systems. Perhaps the clearest
point demonstrated by the cases discussed in this article is that the
federal and state systems are so intertwined that any constitutional
discourse must necessarily reflect an interaction between the two.
To that extent, Gardner is wrong about the lack of state constitu-
tional discourse. In Alaska, reasoned decisions are being made
every day based on provisions of the state constitution as under-
stood through the universal language that has developed against the
backdrop of federal constitutional interpretation. However, as
Alaska's constitutional jurisprudence demonstrates, just because the
language is universal does not mean that the standards and
concepts are universally applicable.
The development of the sliding-scale and balancing tests in the
equal protection and privacy areas is a prime example of the
188. Gardner, supra note 2, at 818.
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Alaskan discourse. While the federal two-tiered test provides the
baseline for the state court's experience, both the state constitution
and general principles of federalism provide for a case-by-case
development of a test that is more appropriate for Alaska.
Particularly in the case of equal protection, the court, the commen-
tators, and even some justices of the United States Supreme Court
have long recognized the need for something between the prongs
of the two-tier test in order to protect individual rights. Alaska's
constitutional discourse described above reflects the thought and
effort that one state has invested in studying these issues. The
result has been a different, some might say better, test. This type
of development is a fundamental function of the states-to be
laboratories for the federal system.
In fact, the development of Alaska's independent approach to
state constitutional review is itself part of the very discourse that
Professor Gardner has not recognized. The fruits of this discourse
have provided Alaskans with a strong source of protection for
individual rights: their own state constitution. Perhaps the reason
Professor Gardner is missing this discourse in NJF is that he is not
looking in the right place. For as Professor Wise has recognized,
"[a]s the Alaska Supreme Court continues to apply its sliding scale
approach independently, other jurisdictions would do well to take
note. Perhaps these northern lights are more than just an interest-
ing phenomenon; perhaps they are a north star that could guide
other courts."1 89
189. Wise, supra note 51, at 47.
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APPENDIX I
The Constitution of the State of Alaska
Preamble
We the people of Alaska, grateful to God and to those who
founded our nation and pioneered this great land, in order to
secure and transmit to succeeding generations our heritage of
political, civil, and religious liberty within the Union of States, do
ordain and establish this constitution for the State of Alaska.
Article I-Declaration of Rights"g
Section 1-Inherent Rights
This constitution is dedicated to the principles that all persons
have a natural right to life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and the
enjoyment of the rewards of their own industry; that all persons are
equal and entitled to equal rights, opportunities, and protection
under the law; and that all persons have corresponding obligations
to the people and to the state.
Section 2-Source of Government
All political power is inherent in the people. All government
originates with the people, is founded upon their will only, and is
instituted solely for the good of the people as a whole.
Section 3-Civil Rights
No person is to be denied the enjoyment of any civil or
political right because of race, color, creed, sex, or national origin.
The legislature shall implement this section.
Section 4--Freedom of Religion
No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof
Section 5-Freedom of Speech
Every person may freely speak, write, and publish on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right.
190. Alaska has amended article I three times since 1956. In 1972, article I was
twice amended to insure greater protection in the areas of equal protection and
privacy. Specifically, section 3 was modified to include gender under the
protection of equal civil and political rights, see HARRIsON, supra note 26, at 10,
12, and section 22 was added to recognize explicitly the right to personal privacy,
see id. at 10, 18. Finally, section 23 was added in 1988 to permit the state to grant
preferences based on Alaska residence to state residents to the extent permitted
by the United States Constitution. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 23.
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Section 6-Assembly; Petition
The right of the people peaceably to assemble, and petition
the government shall never be abridged.
Section 7-Due Process
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law. The right of all persons to fair and just
treatment in the course of legislative and executive investigations
shall not be infringed.
Section 8-Grand Jury
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand
jury, except in cases arising in the armed forces in the time of war
or public danger. Indictment may be waived by the accused. In
that case the prosecution shall be by information. The grand jury
shall consist of at least twelve citizens, a majority of whom concur-
ring may return an indictment. The power of grand juries to
investigate and make recommendations concerning public welfare
or safety shall never be suspended.
Section 9-Jeopardy and Self-Incrimination
No person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.
No person shall be compelled in any criminal proceeding to be a
witness against himself.
Section 10-Treason
Treason against the State consists only in levying war against
it, or in adhering to its enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No
person shall be convicted of treason, unless on the testimony of two
witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.
Section 11-Rights of Accused
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of twelve, except
that the legislature may provide for a jury of not more than twelve
or less than six in courts not of record. The accused is entitled to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
released on bail, except for capital offenses when the proof is
evident or the presumption great; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense.
Section 12-Excessive Punishment
Excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. Penal
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administration shall be based on the principle of reformation and
upon the need for protecting the public.
Section 13-Habeas Corpus
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or actual or imminent
invasion, the public safety requires it.
Section 14-Searches and Seizures
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses
and other property, papers and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated. No warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Section 15-Prohibited State Action
No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed. No
law impairing the obligation of contracts, and no law making any
irrevocable grant of special privileges or immunities shall be passed.
No conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate.
Section 16-Civil Suits; Trial by Jury
In civil cases where the amount in controversy exceeds two
hundred fifty dollars, the right of trial by jury of twelve is preserved
to the same extent as it existed at common law. The legislature
may make provision for a verdict by not less than three-fourths of
the jury and, in courts not of record, may provide for a jury of not
less than six or more than twelve.
Section 17-Imprisonment for Debt
There shall be no imprisonment for debt. This section does
nor prohibit civil arrest of absconding debtors.
Section 18-Eminent Domain
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use
without just compensation.
Section 19-Right to Bear Arms
A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a
free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not
be infringed.
Section 20-Quartering Soldiers
No member of the armed forces shall in time of peace be
quartered in any house without the consent of the owner or
occupant, or in time of war except as prescribed by law. The
military shall be in strict subordination to civil power.
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Section 21-Construction
The enumeration of rights in this constitution shall not impair
or deny others retained by the people.
Section 22-Right of Privacy
The right of privacy shall not be infringed. The legislature
shall implement this section.
Section 23-Resident Preference
This constitution does not prohibit the State from granting
preferences, on the basis of Alaska residence, to residents of the
State over nonresidents to the extent permitted by the Constitution
of the United States.

